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The Legal Limits of Personal Liberties in Time of War
Policing of the home front in time of war necessarily involves an exten-
sion of governmental control over the individual. The extent of the need
for such control is measured by the exigencies of the conflict itself. How-
ever, the extent of the authority under which such control may be exercised
is fixed by the Constitution; broadly speaking, by the "war powers" on the
one hand and the Bill of Rights on the other. The problem confronting
legislators and courts is that of providing all necessary wartime controls and
at the same time reconciling the restraints inherent in the exercise of the
war powers with the freedom which those powers are invoked to defend.
The Constitution guarantees freedom of religion, speech, press and
assembly,1 protects against unreasonable searches and seizures, 2 safeguards
due process of law 3 and trial by jury,4 forbids involuntary servitude.5 On
the other hand, Congress has power not only to declare war but also "to
make all laws which shall be necessary and proper" for its prosecution.
6
And even the most primary of civil rights, habeas corpus, may be suspended
"when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." 7
Since in the prosecution of war certain repressive measures which
would be deemed dictatorial in times of peace s are indispensable, it is
pertinent to inquire into the nature of the Constitutional authority under
which they may be invoked, the scope of such measures and their relation
to the evils they are designed to correct, their effect upon the liberties
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, the judicial tests which may be applied
to their interpretation, and the public policies which should guide their
administration.
THE BILL OF RIGHTS
It is important to note the scope of the Bill of Rights as shown by the
decisions delimiting the liberties thereunder, for only in this way can it be
determined in what manner the first ten amendments restrict or otherwise
affect the measures which may be taken for the public safety. These are
most conveniently reviewed under their traditional classifications.
Freedom of Religion
In the recent case of Minersville School District v. Gobitis9 the
Supreme Court of the United States held that where there is a conflict of
religious convictions and the political concern of society, the citizen is not
relieved from the discharge of his political responsibilities. The social
interest here held paramount to religious liberty is the "cohesive senti-
I. U. S. CONST. AMEND. I.
2. U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. IV.
3. U. S. CONsT. AMEND. V.
4. U. S. CONsT. AMEND. VI.
5. U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. XIII.
6. U. S. CONsT. Art. I, §8 (i), (18).
7. U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 9 (2).
8. "Only the emergency that makes it irhmediately dangerous to leave the cor-
rection of evil counsels to time warrants making any exception. .. " Mr. Justice
Holmes dissenting in Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 630 (;9;9).
9. 310 U. S. 586, 127 A. L. R. 1 1502 (1940). See Supp. (940) I BI.L oF
RIGHTs REv. No. i (reprint of brief filed arnci curie by Bill of Rights Committee,
A. B. A.).
(598)
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ment" of nationalism sought through a compulsory flag salute in the
schools: On the authority of this case, it would appear that when the far
greater interest of national existence itself is at hazard the court would
not hesitate to uphold any measure restraining religious liberty which
bears any reasonable relation to the national war effort.
Free Speech and Free Press
In the first sedition case of World War I, Schenck v. United States,10
Mr. Justice Holmes spoke for a unanimous court in laying down the famous
"dear and present danger" test:
"The question in every case is whether the words used are used in
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a dear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that
Congress has a right to prevent." "-
The inadequacy of this test as a judicial yardstick is demonstrated
by the fact that Mr. Justice Holmes himself dissented in most of the cases
applying it.' 2  A more objective test, namely that speech should be free
so long as it stops short of direct incitement to law-breaking, was laid down
by Judge Learned Hand, although on statutory rather than constitutional
grounds, in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten,8 but this view was rejected
by the Circuit Court.-4 In the present state of the law, it cannot be said
with certainty what expressions of opinion may be held unlawful, for "it is
a question of proximity and degree." '- In an "all-out" war in which
propaganda is a major weapon even idle gossip might meet the "clear and
present danger" test. Since the substantive evil would be the furnishing
of useful information or the dissemination of enemy propaganda, such
problems of intent as arise might be surmounted by the doctrine of "con-
structive" 16 intent or the legislative mechanism of "irrebuttable presump-
tion" of intent, although the validity of the latter is highly doubtful.' 7
However, there is a point at which there is not only a social interest' 8
but a military advantage in free discussion. First, the danger of giving
aid to the enemy must be weighed against the danger of impairing public
morale; second, public criticism of the conduct of the war is an essential
check upon profiteering, official blundering, and deficiencies of leadership.'"
10. 249 U. S. 47 (1919).
ii. Id. at 52.
12. Pierce v. United States, 252 U. S. 239 (192o) ; Schaefer v. United States,
251 U. S. 466 (Ig2o) ; Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 6x6 (1919).
13. 244 Fed. 535 (S. D. N. Y. 1917).
14. 246 Fed. 24 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917).
I5. Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 52 (I919), cited notes io, II supra.
I6. Schaefer v. United States, 251 U. S. 466, 479 (192o); Abrams v. United
States, 250 U. S. 616, 621 (I919), cited note 12 supra.
17. Henier v. Donnan, 285 U. S. 312 (1932) (irrebutable presumption held to
create a substitute for proof in violation of Fifth Amendment), 31 MIc. L. REv.
135, 41 YALE L. J. 9o6; Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U. S. 230 (1926) (conclusive
presumption in state tax law held violative of Fourteenth Amendment) ; 9 WinaoRE,
EvDIFrcE (3d ed. 1940) § 2492.
18. "I think that the judges themselves have failed adequately to recognize their
duty of weighing considerations of social advantage. The duty is inevitable, and
the result of the often proclaimed judicial aversion to deal with such considerations is
simply to leave the very ground and foundation of judgments inarticulate, and often
unconscious. . . " Holmes, The Path of the Law (1897) 1o HARv. L. REv. 457, 467.
1g. "The First Amendment protects two kinds of interest in free speech. There
is an individual interest, the need of many men to express their opinions on matters
vital to them if life is to be worth living, and a social interest in the attainment of
truth, so that the country may not only adopt the wisest course of action but carry
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While these factors are intangible, they must be taken into account in
appraising "clear and present danger," and to that extent they may be
held to modify the war powers .2  But there is little reason to believe that,
if these conditions are met, the Supreme Court will deny* Congress the
right to impose such restraints upon free speech as it deems necessary to
the successful prosecution of the war.21
In the free press category we may include radio, telegraph, motion
pictures and all other electrical or mechanical means of communication.
The rationale of the free speech cases applies to all of them. There is
ample judicial precedent for restriction upon communications in time of
war.2 2  Publication of military information valuable to the enemy neces-
sarily represents a danger which is both "clear" and "present." 22 Dis-
cussion of war policies presents a different problem, but even where the
Holmes test is not met it should be remembered that the government may
effectively suppress any newspaper or periodical it wishes by withdrawing
the privilege of the mails.24 The right to distribute by other means would
presumably remain, but how useful it would be in practice is highly prob-
lematical. Radio stations, which hold their licenses as a matter of grace
and not of right, are subject to strict government control, as are the tele-
phone and telegraph, through the Federal Communications Commission.
Motion pictures, subject to censorship even in time of peace, might expect
to be quickly suppressed if their tendencies were considered even remotely
harmful.
Freedom of Assembly
This right, it should be remembered, is always subject to the common
law strictures against unlawful assembly, which may be held to encompass
a wide variety of circumstances. However, in De Jonge v. Oregon 25 it
was held that a state statute, prohibiting meetings sponsored by persons
advocating violent overthrow of government, violated the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.26 But it was stated in Herndon v.
it out in the wisest way. This social interest is especially important in war time."
Chafee, Freedom of Speech in War Time (191) 32 HARv. L. REv. 932, 958. See
also Pound, Interests of Personality (1914) 28 HARv. L. REV. 445, 453-456.
20. "In every case, therefore, where legislative abridgment of the rights is
asserted, the courts should b6 astute to examine the effect of the challenged legisla-
tion. . '. . And so, as cases arise, the delicate and difficult task falls upon the
courts to weigh the circumstances and to appraise the substantiality of the reasons
advanced in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of the rights." Schneider
v. State, 3o8 U. S. 147, 161 (1939) (involving peace-time handbill ordinance).
21. In World War I such restraints were not considered limitations upon the
Bill of Rights. REPORT OF THE ATTOR-Ey GEaCmAI. OF THE UNITED STATES (1918)
20: "This department throughout the war has proceeded upon the general principle
that the constitutional right of free speech, free assembly, and petition exist in
war time as in peace time, and that the right of discussion of governmental policy
and the right of political agitation are most fundamental rights in a democracy."
22. Pierce v. United States, 252 U. S. 239 (1920); Abrams v. United States,
250 U. S. 616 (1919) ; Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U. S. 204 (1919) ; Schenck
v. United States, 249 U. S. 47 (1919).
23. But note that if the doctrine of constructive intent or irrebutable presump-
tion applied an individual publishing even a local weather report might be criminally
liable.
24. Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 246 Fed. 24 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917).
25. 299 U. S. 353 (1937), 25 CALIF. L. REV. 496, 4 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 489, 37
COL. L. REV. 857, 50 HARv. L. REv. 689, Note (1937) 14 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 369;
see Spencer, Criminal Syndicalism (1937) 16 Omn. L. REv. 278; (937) 46 YALE L.
J. 862.
26. See also Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S. 496
(939).
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Lowry 2 7 that restrictions upon freedom of assembly were justified where
there was "a reasonable apprehension of danger to organized govern-
ment," 28 and that such restrictions were proper if they had "appropriate
relation to the safety of the state." 29
The Other "Freedoms"
Taken together, the decisions of the Supreme Court which involve
civil liberties leave wide latitude for such legislation as Congress may
consider necessary to the war effort.8 0 Other Constitutional guarantees
are similarly circumscribed. The right to bear arms 81 is virtually a dead
letter.8 2 The search and seizure provision likewise lacks adequate enforce-
ment machinery; 8 difficulties inherent in obtaining redress seriously cur-
tail its usefulness. Star Chamber proceedings leading to internment of
enemy aliens in concentration camps seem far removed from the layman's
concept of due process."' And the average citizen would have some diffi-
culty in distinguishing compulsory military service from "involuntary
servitude." 8 5 As for habeas corpus, the Supreme Court denied that Presi-
dent Lincoln had the power to suspend it in a non-military zone,86 but the
fact remains that he did it. In general, it may be said that there appears
to be little likelihood that any measure functionally necessary to the conduct
of the war Will be stricken down on the ground that it transgresses upon
civil liberties.
TlHE FEDERAL STArUTES
Since the Supreme Court has interposed no serious obstacles, what
weapons has the Congress created for the war against the "Fifth Column"?
Treason, of course, is foremost in any list of crimes against the state,
8 7
and applies both to citizens and aliens,38 but judicial construction has
limited its application 8 and the doctrine of "constructive" 40 treason has
never found acceptance here.4 ' Conspiracies to overthrow the government
27. 301 U. S. 242 (1937); see Heller, Freedom of Assembly (1940) 25 MARQ.
L. REV. I, 5.
28. 3o U. S. 242, 258 (1937).
29. Ibid.
3o. Salus republic supremnz lex, a dangerous aphorism, lies close to the surface
of the judicial rationale. See Note (1928) 42 HARv. L. REV. 265.
31. U. S. CONST. AMEND. II.
32. See Chafee, Artm~, Right to Bear (1930) 2 ENcyc. Soc. Sc. 209.
33. 2 WILLOUGHBY, CoNsTiTUTIoNAL LAW (2d ed. 1929) § 720; 8 WiGmo,
EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) §§ 2183, 2184; LASsoN, HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
FOuRTH AMENDMENT (1937); Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures (1921)
34 HARV. L. REV. 361.
34. U. S. CONST. AMEND. V. No person shall be . . . deprived of . . . lib-
erty . . . without due process of law.
35. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366 (i918). There was no conscrip-
tion in the United States prior to the Civil War, and under the first statute service
could be avoided by payment.
36. Ex Parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2 (U. S. 1866).
37. U. S. CONST. Art. III § 3; 35 STAT. 1088 (199), 18 U. S. C. A. §§ i,.2
(1934).
38. Carlisle v. United States, 16 Wall. 147 (U. S. 1872).
39. 3 WHARTON, C.IMINAL LAW (12th ed. 1932) §§ 2159, 216o; cf. United States
v. Hanaway, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,299 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1851). But see Homestead
Case, I Pa. Dist. 785 (1892) (grand jury charge) ; Ex Parte Bollman & Swarthwout,
4 Cranch 75 (U. S. 1807); United States v. Greathouse, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,254
(C. C. N. D. Cal. 1863) ; Mnm. R, CRI I NAL LAW (1934) § 172L
40. 2 STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CraMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND (1883) C. 23. But
see Bridges, A Suggestion Toward a New Definition of Treason (1939) 30 J. Cam!.
L. 47o.
41. It is suggested that this is because the same result is achieved through legis-
lation. See Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U. S. 204, 210 (I919).
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of the United States by force have been crimes since long before the last
World War.4 2 The common law rules of criminal attempt and incitement
still apply, but the principal remedies are statutory. A recent study of
free speech 1 lists fifteen Federal statutes on interference with the govern-
ment, three on objectionable foreign influences, three on aliens, three on
the use of the mails, two on importation and interstate transportation, and
three governing search warrants, all bearing in some manner upon the
Bill of Rights. But the list ends in I94O, and since that time Congress
has been far from idle. In 1941, up to the outbreak of war on December 7,
it enacted seven new statutes dealing with "subversive influences," 4' and
in nineteen different appropriation acts provided that the appropriations
thereunder were not to be used to pay persons or members of organiza-
tions advocating forcible overthrow of the government. 46
In World War I the government's principal weapons against internal
dissidence were the Espionage Act of 1917, which is still in effect,4 7 and
the Sedition Act of 1918,4s which was repealed in 1921.49  In World
War II it has, as a supplement to the former and a more drastic counter-
part of the latter, the Alien Registration Act of 194o.50 The title of this
statute is misleading, for in addition to its registration function it gives
the government broader powers over citizen and alien alike than it enjoyed
even under the Espionage Act of 1917. In effect it is an omnibus "anti-
subversion" statute.
The Act makes it unlawful to interfere with the armed forces with
intent to influence their loyalty, morale or discipline, either by advice and
counsel or by means of written or printed matter.51 It makes unlawful
the production and distribution of written or printed matter advocating
the violent overthrow of the government, as well as membership in or
association with organizations having such objectives, knowing the pur-
poses thereof.5 2 Attempts or conspiracies to commit the prohibited acts are
42. REV. STAT. §5336 (1875) ; 35 STAT. 1089 (igog), I8 U. S. C. A. §6 (934).
43. C r Ear FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941).
44. Id. at 572-574.
45. Act of June 20, 1941, 55 STAT. 252, Pub. L. 113 (immigration visas, etc.,,
may be refused aliens likely to endanger public safety of United States); Act of
June 21, 1941, 55 STAT. 252, 253, Pub. L. 114 (President authorized to restrict immi-
gration or emigration of aliens during war or emergency); Appropriation Act of
June 28, 1941, 55 STAT. 292, Pub. L. 135 ($ioo,OOO for investigation of Federal em-
ployes who are members of subversive organizations, by F. B. I.) ; Emergency Relief
Appropriation Act of July I, 1941, 55 STAT. 402, Pub. L. 143 § 1o (f) (employment
of Communists or members of Nazi Bund on work relief prohibited) ; Act of August
II, 1941, 55 STAT. 616, Pub. L. 2o3 (plant protection force to investigate sabotage
or subversive activity in and to naval shore establishments) ; Act of August 21, 1941,
55 STAT. 655, Pub. L. 234 (amendment to act to punish injury or destruction of war
material by redefining national defense material) ; Act of October 13, 1941, 55 STAT.
736, Pub. L. 268 (penalty provided for photographing alien registration cards).
46. Appropriations covering: Maritime Commission, 4th defense supplement, de-
fense aid supplement, first deficiency, independent offices, fifth defense supplement,
naval, War Department, Treasury and Post Office, State, Commerce, Justice, Fed-
eral Judiciary, Interior, military, relief, Agriculture, Legislative, Federal Security
(Labor), District of Columbia, second deficiency, and second defense supplemental.
47. 40 STAT. 217 (1917), 50 U. S. C. A. §§31-38 (1934).
48. 40 STAT. 553 (1918).
49. 41 STAT. 1359, 1360 (1921).
50. 54 STAT. 670 (1940). See Legis. (0935) 35 Co. L. REV. 917 (94) 41 id.
i59; Oppenheimer, The Constitutional Rights of Aliens, (194) I BILL OF RIGHTS
Rzv. I00; Biddle, Wechsler and others, Symposium on Civil Liberties (194) 9 Am.
L. ScHooL REv. 881.
51. Alien Registration Act. Tit. I, § I.
52. Id. § 2.
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likewise made criminal, 53 and written or printed matter falling within the
terms of the Act is subject to seizure. 4 The maximum penalty is $I0,OOO
fine and ten years in prison.55 The Act also provides for regulation of
aliens and establishes certain new rules relative to deportations.
Apart from the routine of registration, little was heard of this statute
until the outbreak of the war, but within two weeks thereafter 2886 enemy
aliens, "regarded as dangerous to the peace and safety of the country,"
were arrested.56 In the first days of the war a few arrests of citizen sus-
pects were made by zealous United States Attorneys. These actions were
quickly recalled, and Attorney General Biddle announced that prosecutions
of citizens would be conducted only upon express authorization by the
Department of Justice.57 If this policy of preliminary review can be con-
sistently followed under the stress of war conditions it may do much to
soften the rigors of a statute containing many potentialities for harm.
STATE LEGISLATION
It is not within the scope of this note to survey the state statutes in-
volving the liberties of individuals. One recent summary lists twenty
pages of such enactments on freedom of speech alone,58 and does not include
any state laws passed since i94o. 59 These statutes raise the question
whether they do not impede rather than supplement the Federal govern-
ment's efforts,60 and whether they may not be instruments of political
oppression. They are frequently inconsistent, establishing -state criteria of
criminality varying both in nature and degree.
CRITERIA OF CRIMINALITY
Federal and state legislation now in effect covers a wide variety of
acts considered subversive.6 As the war proceeds, it is likely that this list
will be extended. 62 Bills have been offered in Congress making even
remote "bad tendency" punishable, 63 to the extent that it would be unlaw-
ful to think evil of the government.64 It is not inconceivable, depending
upon the temper of the public and the fortunes of war, that some such
53. Id. §3.
54. Id. §4.
55. Id. § 5.
56. Press conference statement by Attorney General Biddle, Dec. 20, 1941; N. Y.
Times, Dec. 21, 1941, § I, p. 23.
57. Public statement by Attorney General, Dec. 16, 1941; N. Y. Times, Dec. 17,
1941, p. 24.
58. CHAFZ op. cit. supra note 43, 575-597.
59. Adverted to in Ward, The Communist Party and the Ballot (ig14i) I BmL oF
RIGT ,s REV. 286.
6o. The Attorney General asked after the declaration of war that citizens and
local and state governments consult with t he Federal Bureau of Investigation instead
of taking "direct action" against suspected aliens. N. Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1941, p. 22.
6I. Notes 44, 45, 6o supra.
62. A number of drastic bills were on the House of Representatives calendar of
December 5, two days prior to the outbreak of war, including one to establish an
optional death penalty for sabotage, H. R. 2, Cong. Rec. Index No. XXIII, Vol. 87
(1941).
63. Legis., Recent Federal Legislation Against Subversive Influences (1941)
41 CoL L. REV. i59.
64. 54 STAT. 1137, 1141 (940), 8 U. S. C. A. § 705 (Supp. 1941) (refusal of
naturalization) ; H. K- 4905, 76th Cong. ist Sess. (March 9, 1939) (deportation of
aliens); H. R. 4909, 76th Cong. ist Sess. (March 9, 1939) (ineligibility to hold
government position); H. R. 4907, 76th Cong. 1st Sess. (March 9, 1939) (registra-
tion of organizations), but not followed in registration law, 54 STAT. 1201 (1940),
I8 U. S. C. A. §§ 14-17 (Supp. 1941).
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legislation may yet be enacted. Unfortunately it is not necessary to con-
sider this problematical future, for in the Alien Registration Act we
already have a new crime of "association" e5 which brings us perilously
close to the same result. It is a crime under the Act to belong to or be
associated with an organization or group advocating violent overthrow of
the government, knowing its purposes. Membership may be considered
evidence of knowledge of purpose. 8 Nor does it seem unlikely that affilia-
tion with a "front" organization, so-called, might lead to the same result.8 7
Ironically, Congress aimed this legislation directly at the Communist Party
only a few months before the U. S. S. R. became America's anti-Axis
partner in the war. The lawmakers apparently assumed that the Com-
munist Party advocated violent overthrow of the United States govern-
ment, although this much-mooted point is only now on its way to deter-
mination by the Supreme Court. 68
Can anyone be punished for what he thinks? The Supreme Court has
said not. 9 Yet nearly 3oo0 enemy aliens,70 some of them lifelong residents
of the United States, have been arrested under a statute that does not
require that they be proved guilty of any overt act. They must depend
upon the decision of the Attorney General, based in turn upon recom-
mendations by civilian hearing boards, to determine whether they shall be
released, paroled, or interned for the duration of the war.71 The hearings
are secret, the suspect may or may not be permitted to attend.7 2 The
action is not subject to judicial review. And under a technique developed
during World War I even a naturalized citizen may find himself an "enemy
alien," if it is decided that he made mental reservations on taking his
oath. 
7
What of citizens? The doctrine of "association" raises the question
whether membership in an organization is in itself an overt act, particularly
if past membership makes one equally guilty. If it is, the rationale must
rest upon a tenuous and highly technical basis. If it is not, it may well be
contended that it is too late to catch a subversive individual after he has
committed a disastrous overt act, and too hazardous to await an attempt,
which under the law must come dangerously close to success. And even
without an overt act the "clear and present danger" test might be satisfied,
as in the case of a known partisan of the enemy with a notoriously violent
history. Having provided that an enemy alien might be judged in Star
Chamber and imprisoned without an overt act, why should not the Con-
gress extend the same principle to citizens, since the danger to be appre-
hended from disloyal individuals is not affected by their citizenship
65. Alien Registration Act, Tit. I, § 2.
66. State v. Boloff, 138 Ore. 568, 7 P. (2d) 775 (1932), 45 HARv. L. REV. 927.
67. In Pennsylvania a number of State employes were dismissed under the terms
of a similar statute for alleged association with groups described as "front"' organiza-
tions for the Communist Party.
68. Schneiderman v. United States, i19 F. (2d) 5oo (C. C. A. 9th, 1941), cert.
filed, io U. S. L. WEK 3081 (1941). See (941) 89 U. OF PA. L. Rzv. 823 (judicial
notice of Communist Party's objectives).
69. Under the First Amendment "Congress was deprived of all legislative power
over mere opinion." Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145, 164 (1878).
7o. Note 56 supra. There were 1,46o Japanese, 1,2o4 Germans, 222 Italians.
71. The Department of Justice stated that the Attorney General would render
the final decision as to the disposition of each case. Note 56 supra.
72. Id. "As a general rule, the alien concerned will be present at such hearing,
though occasional exceptions may be made, especially in cases where confidential
information of possible value to the enemy is involved."
73. United States v. Wursterbarth, 249 Fed. go (D. N. J. 1918).
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status? ' The answer is that the citizen, too, comes within the purview
of the act for the "registration" of "aliens," which provides in Section 2
that "it shall be unlawful for any person . . ."
THE INNOCENT BYSTANDER
The object sought to be achieved through repressive war legislation is
elimination of influences designed to help the enemy. On the basis of the
experience of World War I, its effectiveness may be questioned, 7 and the
results may not justify the price paid in terms- of freedom sacrificed.7 6
This is debatable. But it is not debatable that such statutes are dangerous
weapons, requiring the utmost administrative and judicial control lest they
become instruments of oppression.77 The experience of the last war in
this respect was not a happy one.
78
Because of the human factor involved in the administration of all law,
individual injustice is bound to result from the application of laws dealing
with the intangibles of "subversive" activity. This is particularly true in
the absence of any test which might be applied by judges and prosecutors
in dealing with the cases before them. We have seen that the "clear and
present danger" criterion breaks down in practice. Judge Hand's test,7 9
it is true, furnishes a tool which judges and juries can use. But it is after
all only the common law test of incitement, and the recent flood of new
statutes on "subversion" indicates that this is not what the Congress
wanted. It wanted action, and action before the danger could become
either "clear" or "present," so long as it lurked in the vicinity.
Even so, every possible effort consistent with the proper conduct of
the war should be made to protect the innocent. Since their greatest
danger is from blind public frenzy the method of public education, sug-
gested in time of peace by the head of the Civil Liberties division of the
Department of Justice,8 ° has much to commend it. But in time of war it
is not even desirable, for the public must be educated to hate the enemy.
Under such circumstances it is unrealistic to expect an aroused public to
act with judicial impartiality when it suspects disloyalty. Likewise, it is
to be expected that state legislatures will enact "shotgun" legislation, and
that state officials and courts will reflect local hysteria in administering
such laws."-
* Since this danger of injustice is apparent, it is pertinent to inquire
whether all matters dealing with subversive activity should not be handled
by Federal authorities. The Attorney General has in effect asked that this
be done.8 2  Centralized responsibility and control, establishing uniformity
of administration and policy, certainly seem desirable. The war power
resides in the Congress, and since treason against the United States is not
74. It was argued by Representative Smith of Virginia that the House should
make no distinction between citizens and aliens, as the danger was the same in either
case. 84 CoNG. RE.Q 10452 (1939).
75. CEAPE, op. cit. supra notes 43, 58, at 513.
76. Loewenstein, Legislative Control of Political Extreminm in European Democ-
racies (1938) 38 Co. L. REV. 591.
77. Chafee, Freedom of Speech in War Time (I979) 32 HAnv. L. REv. 932, g6o.
78. Legis. (1935) 35 Cot.. L. REv. 917, 99.
79. Note 13 supra.
So. Schweinhaut, The Ci-vil Liberties Sectio, of the Department of Justice (941)
i BILL OF RIGHTS REv. 206, 216.
81. O'Brian, Assistant to the Attorney General of the United States, reporting
on public hysteria, (1919) 52 N. Y. BAR AssN. REP. 287.
82. Note 6o supra.
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punishable by the states,83 there seems no reason why any other interfer-
ence with the war power should be.8 4  The recent case of Hines v.
Davidowit, 5 invalidating the Pennsylvania Alien Registration Act, looks
in this direction. If Congress has not already enacted all legislation neces-
sary to deal with the problem of subversive activities nationally, it certainly
should do so. If it has, then the constitutionality of State legislation over-
lapping the same field would appear doubtful under the doctrine enunciated
in the Davidowits case.
During World War I there were some persons, guilty of no crime
whatever, who without any cause other than war hysteria were the victims
of mob violence,88 ill-advised prosecutions, 87 prejudiced juries 88 and biased
judges.8 " With such persons the time element is essential, for it avails
them little to learn from the Supreme Court, after the war is over,90 that
their rights were violated.
If they are suspected, however erroneously, how are they to be pro-
tected from the mob? The inadequacy of local authorities to deal with
such situations has been made notorious by the tragic history of lynching
in the United States. Yet mob psychology is such that if the authority of
the sovereign is asserted firmly, and quickly, the danger quickly subsides.
In Pennsylvania the dispatch of uniformed State policemen into trouble
zones as "observers," under orders to do nothing except to make them-
selves conspicuous unless a breach of the peace is committed in their
presence, proved highly effective when attempted experimentally in 1937-38.
There seems no reason why a similar technique would not be feasible on a
national scale; in fact something of the kind has been done through the use
of "token" detachments of soldiers to preserve order at strike-bound
defense plants.
Where legal process is to be invoked it seems desirable to obtain the
cooperation of State authorities to the end that prosecutions be brought
under Federal law, as noted supra, and where this is not possible the
validity of state statutes might properly be questioned.
Obviously prejudice on the part of juries cannot be avoided simply by
transferring prosecutions from the state to the Federal courts, but where
trial by jury would be ineffective in safeguarding the rights of the accused
it may be waived. Where administrative officers find the facts, as in de-
portation proceedings, it may be that the application of the facts to the law,
as distinct from either questions of law or questions of fact, is properly a
judicial function to be exercised by the courts.91
While Congress has set many legal snares for the spy, the saboteur,
the enemy propagandist, the suspect alien and the disloyal citizen, it has
done little to protect the innocent bystander from the forces of suspicion,
hatred, distrust and vindictiveness which its necessary exercise of the war
powers has set in motion.
83. People v. Lynch, ii Johns. 549 (N. Y. 1814); see Ex Parte Quarrier, z W.
Va. 569, 571 (I866).
84. See Konkel v. State, i68 Wis. 335, 17o N. W. 715 (1919).
85. 312 U. S. 52, 73 (1941). But see Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U. S. 325 (192o).
86. O'Brian, Civil Liberty in War Time (ii) 42 N. Y. BAR Assx. REP. 275, 302.
87. Id. at 304, 305, 309.
88. CHAFE, op. cit. supra note 43, at 70-73.
89. Id. at 74-79.
go. The Supreme Court did not rule on any of the World War I statutes until
long after hostilities had ended.
91. See Pound, Interpretations of Legal History (1923) 154-155; (1938) 48
YALE L. J. iii.
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SUMMA AY
The major conclusion to be drawn from the relationship of the war
powers to civil rights in time of war is that the judicial definition of per-
sonal liberties will be subject to such adjustment as the safety of the state
requires. A corollary to this conclusion is that, in the process of this
adjustment, much individual injustice may result from the lack of any
practical standard of criminality and the consequent resort to the "bad
tendency" or remote causation theory. Procedural reforms such as elim-
ination of overlapping State and Federal jurisdictions, centralized control
of prosecutions, and more expeditious judicial review, should help to
minimize this danger. But it will not be eliminated entirely so long as the
law's vaunted certainty is belied by such tests as that of "clear and present
danger" at a time when to the average individual the most obscure political
heresies may be "clear" subversion and the remotest apprehension may be
a "present" and appalling danger. J.
The Non-Recognition of the U. S. S. R. and Its Effect Upon the
Statute of Limitations
Recognition is the means whereby a new nation, whether originating
in peaceful political change or in the chaos of revolution, is admitted to
that select, though cosmopolitan group, the Family of Nations. Non-
recognition is ostracism, and has important legal consequences.
Recognition can neither bring a new government into existence, nor
keep it from coming into being. Existence is a matter of fact.' However,
recognition can greatly affect the operation of that fact.
There is no international comity,2 no reciprocity of obligation, between
a non-recognized and a non-recognizant government." The unrecognized
sovereign is precluded from using the courts of the non-recognizant coun-
try,4 although fortunately it does receive the same immunity from suit
I. GOEBEL, THE R.ECOGNiTON POLIcY OF THE UNITE STATES (1915) 46; 1 HACK-
WORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1940) § 30, P. 161; HOLLAND, LEcruRzs ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW (933) 91.
2. "Comity" is, at best, a far from concrete term, but it is useful as being com-
prehensive. A helpful definition is that of Mr. Justice Baldwin in Fischer, Brown &
Co. v. Fielding, 67 Conn. 91, Io8 (895):
"What is termed the comity of nations is the formal -expression and ulti-
mate result of that mutual respect accorded throughout the civilized world by
the representatives of each sovereign power to those of every other, in consider-
ing the effects of their official acts. Its source is the sentiment of reciprocal
regard, founded on identity of position and similarity of constitutions."
3. "The entrance of the state into the international statehood, however, depends
entirely upon the recognition by those states already within this circle. Whatever
advantages membership in this circle may confer, and whatever duties it may impose,
do not fall upon the new state until its existence is generally recognized by the
states already within the international circle." WILSON & TuCMR, INTERNATIONIAL
LAW (8th ed. 1922) 49. See also Po~moy, INTERNATIONAL LAW (1886) 265.
4. Republic of China v. Merchant's Fire Assurance Corp. of New York, 3o F.
(2d) 278 (C. C. A. 9th, 1929); The Penza, 277 Fed. 294 (N. D. Cal. i92o) ; R. S.
F. S. R. v. Cibrario, 235 N. Y. 255, 139 N. E. 259 (923); City of Berne v. Bank
of England, 9 Ves. Jr. 347 (1804).
There is no doubt that a recognized foreign sovereign may sue in the courts of
a recognizant nation. The Sapphire, ii Wall. 164 (U. S. 187o); King of Prussia
v. Kuepper, 22 Mo. 55o (1856); Republic of Honduras v. De Soto, 112 N. Y. 3io,
ig N. E. 845 (1889) ; Hulett & Co. v. King of Spain, I Dow and Clark 169, 6 Eng.
Rep. R. 488 (1828) ; HER EY, LEGAL EFrEcrs OF RECOGNITION IN INTERATIONAIj
LAW (1928) 112.
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accorded to all sovereigns. 5 As a result of its inability to sue the sovereign
is often unable to protect many of its interests, and may thereby lose im-
portant substantive rights. 6 Its citizens may not be accorded the privileges
and immunities granted those of a recognized government; its instrumen-
talities may be unable to function properly.7 Hence, recognition means
much to a newly organized government." The Soviet government of Russia
is an excellent illustration of the effect of both recognition and non-
recognition.
In 1917 Russia was a hotbed of revolution and political change.
Within nine months its government changed hands twice. On March I6,
1917, the old Russian Imperial Government was overthrown and succeeded
by the Provisional Government, which was recognized by the United States
six days later. On November 7, 1917, the Provisional Government was
overthrown and succeeded by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
The U. S. S. R. has remained in power to the present day but was not
recognized by the United States until November 16, 1933.' This policy
of non-recognition, pursued for sixteen years, has led to much difficulty in
American courts,10 whose attitude toward foreign governments must be
determined by that of the executive and legislative branches."'
Due to the established rule that an unrecognized foreign sovereign
cannot appear as plaintiff in the courts of the non-recognizant government'1
2
the U. S. S. R. was unable to exercise any right of action accruing against
the United States or a citizen thereof until its recognition in 1933. One
of the problems resulting is this: Did the statute of limitations start to run
against the Soviet governmedft from the time the right of action accrued,
or is it either not applicable to a foreign sovereign or tolled by that sov-
ereign's disability to sue? The United States Supreme Court in Guaranty
Trust Company v. United States"" and the United States District Court
in U. S. S. R. v. National City Bank 14 were recently presented with this
5. A recognized foreign sovereign may not be sued without its consent. Oetjen
v. Central Leather Co., 246 U. S. 297 (1918) ; Porto Rico v. Rosaly, 227 U. S. 270
(1913); The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 7 Cranch. 116 (U. S. 1812).
The question of whether or not a non-recognized foreign sovereign could be sued
without its consent :has recently been before the New York courts. They have held
it could not. Veovodine v. Government of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces of the South of Russia, 232 App. Div. 204, 249 N. Y. Supp. 644 (1931);
Nankivel v. Omsk All-Russian Government, 237 N. Y. 150, 142 N. E. 569 (1923);
Wulfsohn v. R. S. F. S. R., 234 N. Y. 372, 138 N. E. 24 (1923).
This immunity has been extended to sovereign property. The Schooner Ex-
change v. M'Faddon, 7 Cranch. ix6 (U. S. 1812); The Parlement Beige, (188o)
L. R. 5 P. D. 197.
6. See U. S. S. R. v. National City Bank, 41 F. Supp. 353, 355 (S. D. N. Y.
1941); H zvy, LxcA. EFFECTs OF REcOGNITIo IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1928) 112.
7. See Dickinson, The Recognition of Russia (1931) 30 MIcn. L. REv. 181.
8. For a discussion of recognition see Sir John Fischer Williams, Recognition
(1929) 15 TRANSACTIONS OF THE GROTIUS SociEr, 53.
9. For a brief historical summary of the Russian situation, see Guaranty Trust
Co. v. United States, 304 U. S. 126, 138 fn. 4 (1938). For editorial comment see
(934) 28 Am. J. INT. L. go.
Io. See (1932) 26 Am. I. INT. L. 261; Dickinson, The Recognition of Russia
(1931) 30 MIcir. L. REv. 181.
ii. Luther v. Borden, 7 How. I, 42 (U. S. 1849); Rose v. Himely, 4 Cranch.
241, 272 (U. S. 18o8); R. S. F. S. R. v. Cibrario, 235 N. Y. 255, 139 N. E. 259
(1923) ; PoMERoY, INTERNATIONAL LAW (1886) 312; PUENTE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1928) 26.
12. Preobazhenski v. Cibrario, z92 N. Y. Supp. 275 (Sup. Ct. 1922). Other
cases cited note 4 supra.
13. 304 U. S. 126 (1938). Commented on in (1938) 32 Am. 3. INT. L. 542;
(I939) 37 Micxr. L. REV. 931.
14. 41 F. Supp. 353 (S. D. N. Y. 1941) 90 U. OF PA. L. REV. 364.
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problem. Both held the statute barred the action regardless of the sov-
ereign's disabilities.
The Guaranty Trust Company case was decided on the ". principle
that the rights of a sovereign state are vested in the state rather than in
any particular government which may purport to represent it .. .. 15
Since the recognized Provisional Government of the Russian state always
had the right to enforce the state's claims, said the court, there was no
reason to toll the statute-the state had never been under a disability.
U. S. S. R. vt. National City Bank followed this reasoning and added
the policy consideration that, if the statute of limitations was merely tolled
and did not run during the period of non-recognition, ". . . one of the
most effective sanctions of non-recognition would lose most of its value." 16
Two previous cases, George W. Cook v. Mexico 17 and Collac v.
Yugoslav State,8 reached a contrary conclusion. Both cases were argued
before international tribunals 19 but unfortunately the available reports do
not give the reasoning whereby the conclusion was reached.
These cases form the nucleus of our discussion.
I. LEGAL THEORIES INVOLVED
International relations are matters of politics and diplomacy. They
are controlled and regulated by the executive and legislative branches of
the government, not by the judiciary. It is uncontested that recognition
or non-recognition is a question of policy determinable only by the political
branches of the government, with such determination binding upon the
courts.20  However, legal problems inevitably arise involving international
relations and the courts must decide them.
It is the duty of the judiciary to give effect to the purpose behind
political determinations. Policy is therefore a primary consideration. But,
through precedent and a desire to promote stability, the judiciary has
evolved theories upon which it may proceed with relative firmness.
a. Tolling the Statute of Limitations
The most obvious theory with which the Soviet government and its
assignees would attempt to avoid the effects of the statute of limitations is
that of tolling the statute,
The statute of limitations is a defense which may be raised as a bar to
an action not brought within the time required by the statute. Its purpose
is to prevent the bringing of actions after so much time has elapsed that
parties and evidence are scattered and unobtainable.
2'
15. 304 U. S. 126, 137 (1938).
16. 41 F. Supp. 353, 355 (S. D. N. Y. 1941):
17. (1927-1928) ANNUAL DIGEsT, Case No. 174. The editor's note to this case
states, "What seems to be generally admitted is that national statutes of limitation
do not in themselves constitute a bar to international action."
A fuller report of this case may be found in (1928) 22 Az. J. IINT. L. i8%,
Dicta favoring the application of the statute of limitations to a foreign gov-
ernment may be found in Lehigh Valley RR. v. State of Russia, 21 F. (2d) 396,
400 (1927); United States v. Brown, 247 N. Y. 211, 218, 16o N. E. 13, 16 (1928).
But Yee United States v. Harpootlian, 24 F. (2d) 646, 648 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928);
Bowers v. N. Y. & Albany Literage Co., 273 U. S. 346, 350 (1927).
I8. (1929-I930) ANNUAL DIGEsT, Case No. 121.
ig. Respectively the United States and Mexico General Claims and the Hungaro-
Yugoslav Mixed Arbitral Tribunal.
2o. If the courts do not hold themselves bound by such determination, they are
dangerously intermeddling with matters of foreign policy clearly outside their prov-
ince. See cases cited note II supra.
21. The statute of limitations is considered a meritorious defense. United States
v. Oregon Lumber Co., 26o U. S. 290 (1922); Bell v. Morrison, i Pet. 351, 36o
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This commendable purpose is, however, overbalanced when we are
presented with a situation wherein the party against whom the statute ran
was unable to bring suit through no fault of his own. The obvious injus-
tice that would result to such a suitor, if he were now barred because of
his former inaction, is prevented by tolling the statute.
The argument advanced by those who would toll the statute here is
based on an analogy between a disability to sue because of non-recognition
and other disabilities to sue wherein the statute is tolled. Infancy, insanity
and imprisonment are universally accepted as tolling disabilities.2 2 Others
are enumerated in the various limitation statutes.3 The courts seem loath
to lengthen their number. The prevailing attitude was expressed by the
Colorado court in Miller v. Industrial Commission,24 where it was said:
"Unless specific exception is made in the statute of limitations in
favor of those under disability, courts are without power to add such
exception."
It was therefore easy for the courts in the Guaranty and National City Bank
cases to say that the statute of limitations must apply as a procedural rule
of the forum 25 and bar the action. A relaxation of this rigid attitude could
easily have resulted in tolling the statute as to the Soviet government.2 6
Perhaps, for a different reason, the defense of the statute of limitations
should not be available to the defendant in the instant situation. It seems
clear that the defendant who has forced the plaintiff to delay in bringing
his action cannot afterward raise the bar of the statute as a defense.
2 7
Here, the government of the United States prevented the Soviet govern-
ment from bringing suit by refusing recognition. Our government is com-
(U. S. 1828); Lilly-Brackett Co. v. Sonnemann, i57 Cal. 192, io6 Pac. 715 (91o)
(reviewing the authorities); STORY, CoNFLc OF LAWS (8th ed. 1883) 793.
22. See 2 WooD, LImITATION OF Acrioxs (4th ed. 1916) c. 22, p. lO69. A typ-
ical statute is N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr (Cahill, 6th ed. 1931) § 6o.
There are usually some qualifications. New York, for instance, does not per-
mit the statute to be tolled by any disability other than infancy for longer than five
years.
23. See 2 MAss. GEN. LAWS (1932) c. 260; 4 MONT. REV. CODES (935) c. 27;
i Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) art. 9.
24. io6 Colo. 364, 367, 105 P. (2d) 404, 405 (94o). See also Richardson v.
Mertens, 175 Ala. 309, 57 So. 720 (1912); Powell v. Koehler, 52 Ohio St. 1O3, 39
N. E. 195 (1894); Warfield v. Fox, 53 Pa. 382 (1866).
25. The statute of limitations is the applicable law of the forum. See Hanger
v. Abbott, 6 Wall. 532, 538 (U. S. 1867) ; McMerty v. Morrison, 62 Mo. 14o, 143
(1876) ; Miller v. Brenham, 68 N. Y. 83, 87 (1877) ; 3 BEALE, THE CoN-7ICr OF LAWs
(i935) § 693.1, p. 1620.
The statute of limitations is a rule of procedure. M'Elmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet.
311, 327 (U. S. 1839) ; Townsend v. Jemison, 9 How. 407, 413 (U. S. 1850).
This means it merely bars the remedy but not the right. [See Michigan Bank
v. Eldred, 130 U. S. 693, 696 (r889) ; Townsend v. Jemison, 9 How. 407, 413 (U. S.
185o) ; Van Schuyver v. Hartman, i Alaska 431, 432 (19o2)], which may well lead
to a different result than that reached in foreign jurisdictions where the statute is a
substantive rule. The difference between the substantive and procedural views is dis-
cussed in (1919) 28 YALE L. J. 492.
26. This attitude has been relaxed in certain instances, and the running of the
bar has been suspended for a disability not mentioned in the statute. Inland Steel
Co. v. Jelenovic, 84 Ind. App. 373, i5o N. E. 391 (1926) (war suspends statute);
Sands v. Campbell, 31 N. Y. 34t (1865) (injunction while operative suspends stat-
ute) ; Garvin v. Diamond Coal & Coke Co., 278 Pa. 469, 123 Atl. 468 (924) (war
suspends statute); see Weaver v. Davis, 2 Ga. App. 455, 462, 58 S. E. 786, 789
(19o7). Contra: Knipple v. Lipke, 3oo N. W. 62o (Minn. 1941).
27. Thompson v. Phenix Ins. Co., 136 U. S. 287 (1889); Patrick v. Groves, 115
N. J. Eq. 208, 169 At. 701 (934); Howard v. West Jersey & S. S. Ry., io2 N. J.
Eq. 517, 141 At. 755 (1928).
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posed of its citizens and acts for them. Hence, the policy of non-recognition
was a reflection of the will of the defendant in each of the cases before us,
and it would seem more equitable not to allow him to raise the statute of
limitations when it therefore ran as a result of his own actions.
Admittedly the argument is highly theoretical but no more so than
some of the other arguments advanced by the courts, and the result reached
by employing it seems desirable.
b. The Continuing State
"The rights of a sovereign state are vested in the state rather than
in any particular government which may purport to represent
it . ... ) 28
While in the vernacular the State and its Government are used as
identical terms, there is an important distinction between them.
"The State itself is an ideal person, intangible, invisible, immut-
able. The Government is an agent-an instrumentality of the State,-
through which the will of the State is formulated, expressed and
executed .... " 29
This distinction is of much consequence in international law and is of
especial significance in the consideration of the instant problem. The dis-
tinction is necessary if we are to have safety and stability in international
dealings. The case of Russia is an excellent illustration of the point. Any
transactions with Russia were consummated with the State although accom-
plished through the Government. Any claims resulting therefrom rested
with the State, not the Government. Therefore, all those holding claims
or subject to claims are protected, for if the claims rested in the Govern-
ment, they would rise and fall with the Government. Any claims against
the old Imperial Government, for instance, would have become valueless
upon the rise to power of the Provisional Government. The claims, resting
as they do, however, in the State, remain valuable and may be asserted
regardless of any change in Government for the State is omnipresent and
unchangeable.
3 0
Applying this distinction to our present problem we reach the conclu-
sion that the statute of limitations could not have been tolled because the
Russian State was always represented by a government recognized and
capable of bringing suit.31 The Provisional Government continued until
1933 and its ambassadors were here and could prosecute suits for that gov-
ernment.3 2  This was the reasoning followed by the Guaranty Trust Com-
pany and National City Bank cases.
28. Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 3o4 U. S. 126, 137 (1938).
29. PUENTE, INTERNATIONAL LAW (1928) 18. For another definition of "State"
see WHEFATON, ErmNMzrTs OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Scott ed. 1936) § 17, p. 25.
3o. The doctrine of continuity of States has been asserted in: The Sapphire,
ii Wall. 164 (U. S. 387o); Gelston v. Hoyt, 3 Wheat. 246, 324 (U. S. 1818); Le-
high Valley RR. v. State of Russia, 21 F. (2d) 396, 400, 401 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927);
The Rogdai, 278 Fed. 294, 296 (N. D. Cal. 1920); Agency of Canadian Car &
Foundry Co., Lira., v. American Can Co., 258 Fed. 363, 368-369 (C. C. A. 2d, 1919) ;
State of Yucatan v. Argumedo, 92 Misc. 547, 157 N. Y. Supp. 29 (915) ; I HACK-
WORrH, DIEsr OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1940) § 56, p. 387; BAxER, HALmci's
INTERNATIONAL LAW (4th ed. 19o8) 8o.
31. Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U. S. 126, 137-138 (1938) ; Lehigh
Valley RR. v. State of Russia, 21 F. (2d) 396 (1927) ; State of Russia v. Banker's
Trust Co., 4 F. Supp. 417 (S. D. N. Y. 1933).
32. Cases cited note 31 supra. Mr. Bakhmeteff was Russian Ambassador from
July 5, 1917 to June 30, 1922. At this time he retired and Mr. Ughet continued to
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The theory is one that has been often observed,33 but which was
applied in the case of Russia with no apparent awareness of the realities of
the situation. While it was perfectly proper to say that the Russian State
was always in existence, it was most certainly fantastic to say the State
was always represented by a government capable of bringing suit. The
fact that the Provisional Government was recognized by the United States
until 1933 may have prevented the courts from admitting the existence of
the controlling Soviet government during that period and may have forced
them to entertain suits by ambassadors of the Provisional Government.
3 4
However, after recognition of the Soviet regime in 1933 there seems no
compelling reason for the courts to any longer ignore the real conditions
which were existing before 1933. It is true that if the courts now say the
Soviet government was the real government of Russia during most of the
time we recognized the Provisional Government, they are, in effect, con-
tradicting the then determination of the United States political departments.
Not to say so, however, seems a refusal to give effect to the present deter-
mination of our political departments, a consideration of the utmost impor-
tance. Admitting that the Provisional Government was a mere figurehead
and hence not really capable of bringing suit for the Russian State would
support the contention that the statute should be tolled. The result is
desirable, and shows a consciousness of reality.
c. Nullurn Tempus Occurrit Regi
Another theory, less likely than that of tolling the statute, is based
upon the rule nullum tempus occurrit regi 3 5 which seems an outgrowth
of the old axiom rex non potest peccare. 6 The exemption of the king, or
government, from the running of the statute of limitations is no longer
based on the king's prerogative but on the more practical consideration
that the government should not suffer from the negligence of its public
officials in not pressing claims promptly. 7 It is argued that this rule
applies not only to the domestic sovereign but also to foreign sovereigns
bringing suit in domestic courts, and that the statute of limitations is
therefore not applicable to the U. S. S. R.' 8  The contention is not sup-
be recognized by us as the Financial Attach6 and the custodian of Russian property
in the United States.
33. Cases cited notes 3o and 31 supra.
34. In Lehigh Valley RR. v. State of Russia, 21 F. (2d) 396 (927), the
ambassadors of the Provisional government were allowed to sue and collect nearly
$i,ooo,oool The money was handed over to Mr. Ughet, the representative of the
Provisional Government, in spite of the fact that his government had no control and
little interest in the 'actual State of Russia. The case has been properly criticized.
See the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in United States v. Pink, io
U. S. L. WEEK 4171, 4177 (1941); Kallis, The Legal Effects of the Non-Recog-
nition of Russia (1933) 20 VA. L. Rzv. i, ii.
35. "Time does not run against the king." The rule seems to have originated in
U. S. v. Hoar, 26 Fed. Cas. 329, 33o No. I5, 373 (1821). It has been 'followed in
Davis v. Corona Coal Co., 265 U. S. 219 (i924); Grand Trunk Western Ry. v.
United States, 252 U. S. 112 (i92o); Ash's Estate, 202 Pa. 422, 5I At. 1o3o
(igo2); PuENTE, INTERNATioxAL LAW (1928) 84.
Note that the cases involve only the domestic sovereign.
36. "The king can do no wrong." See County of Piatt v. Goodell, 97 Ill. 84, 88
(i88o).
37. United States v. Thompson, 98 U. S. 486, 489 (1878); United States v.
Knight, 14 Pet. 301, 315 (U. S. i84o) ; United States v. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat. 72o,
735 (U. S. 1824).
38. This contention was successfully asserted in United States v. Guaranty Trust
Co., 91 F. (2d) 898 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937), commented on in (1938) 5 U. OF CHL L.
Rzv. 313 and (i937) 47 YALE L. 3. 132.
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ported by either precedent or the reason for the rule. The only authority
favoring the extension of this rule seems to be the dicta of Mr. Justice
Story in United States v. Hoar 89 that the royal prerogative is "equally
applicable to all governments". Since the rule is framed to protect the
sovereign from the negligence of public officials, there is no reason why it
should be employed for the protection of a foreign sovereign against the
negligence of its servants. That is a matter strictly for its own con-
sideration.
The problem of whether or not the United States should be barred
when suing as assignee of a foreign sovereign against whom the statute
had run was raised in the Guaranty Trust Company case. The court held
that the bar applied for the same reason it applied to a foreign sovereign-
the reason behind the rule exempting the United States fails when the
United States is assignee for as such its own servants could not have been
negligent.40
Today the protective rule is becoming more and more limited in its
application to the domestic sovereign. Several states have passed laws
specifically removing themselves from this exemption.41 It seems a wise
move since both state and national governments have competent legal
departments to prosecute their claims, and exemption from the conse-
quences of the statutes of limitation may well do the government more
harm than good, for its tendency is to promote laxity in the assertion of
claims.
4 2
d. The Retroactive Effect of Recognition
As a general proposition it may be said that the acts of a sovereign
may not be questioned provided they are completed within the sovereign's
jurisdiction. 48 This is only true, however, of a recognized sovereign, for
non-recognition is usually the unfortunate result of disapproval by the
non-recognizant country.44 Until recognition a foreign nation cannot be
considered the equal of all other nations, and until then does not have juris-
dictional immunity.45 After recognition, however, all acts within the juris-
diction of the recognized nation are considered valid whether they have
been performed before recognition or afterward. This result is accom-
plished by the doctrine of retroactive recognition, which was expressed by
the Supreme Court in Oetjen v. Central Leather Company: 41
"It is also the result of the interpretation by this court of the
principles of international law that when a government which orig-
39. 26 Fed. Cas. 329, 330, No. 15,373 (1821). This dictum'may be found in
Fink v. O'Neil, io6 U. S. 272, 281 (1882); United States v. Thompson, 98 U. S.
486, 490 (1878) ; Gibson v. Chouteau, 13 Wall. 92, 99 (U. S. 187).
40. 304 U. S. 126, 41 (1938). Note that the court did not apply the usual rule
that the assignee stands in the shoes of his assignor. Southern Pacific Co. v. Globe
Indemnity Co., 21 F. (2d) 288, 290 (1927).
41. 2 MAss. GEr. LAws (1932) C. 260, § I8; 4 MONT. REV. CODES (1935) §9043;
i Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) §888; N. Y. Civ. PRac. ACT (Cahill, 6th ed. 1931) §54.
42. For this suggestion -see (1937) 47 YALE L. J. 132.
43. Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U. S. 126, 140 (1938); Oetien
v. Central Leather Co., 246 U. S. 297, 303 (I918); Day-Gormley Leather Co. v.
National City Bank of New York, 8 F. Supp. 503 (S. D. N. Y. 1934); Princess
Paley Olga v. Weisz, (1929) 1 K. B. 718.
44. Gelston v. Hoyt, 13 Johns. 561, 588 fn. (a) (N. Y. 1816); r OPPENHErm,
INTERNATIONAL LAW (5th ed. 1937) § 73, P. 124; PIENTE INTE:RNATIOxAL LA-W
(1928) 27.
45. STcrO , OurTINEs OF INTERNATiONAL LAw (1914)'87.
46. 246 U. S. 297, 302-303 (1918).
"It is incompetent for them (the courts) to anticipate the political depart-
ments; but once recognition has been granted the courts may treat it as oper-
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inates in revolution or revolt is recognized by the political department
of our government as the de jure government of the country in which
it is established, such recognition is retroactive in effect and validates
all the actions and conduct of the government so recognized from the
commencement of its existence."
This doctrine was conceived so that the courts would be relieved of
the embarrassing duty of passing upon the rightfulness or wrongfulness
of the acts of a now recognized sovereign, which duty would be equally
painful, and dangerous, whether the acts were committed before or after
recognition.47 The element of "fair play" also enters into the courts' con-
sideration of retroactivity. If acts done prior to recognition were in-
effective, the now recognized government would often be deprived of
rightful property and interests.
48
All the cases which have thus far employed the doctrine of retro-
activity appear to involve some act or acts done by the sovereign during
its period of non-recognition. We are presently concerned with the appli-
cation. of this doctrine when the sovereign has failed to act-when it did
not bring its action within the statutory period. How should it be applied
in such a situation?
Counsel for the Government in the Guaranty Trust Company cases
suggested the doctrine would make the recognition of the former Pro-
visional Government of Russia and all acts of that government void. This
would support counsel's contention that there was no recognized govern-
ment in Russia capable of bringing suit and therefore the statute of
limitations should be tolled. The court properly refused to employ the
doctrine in this manner on the ground that recognition retroactively affected
only those acts of the recognized government done within its jurisdiction. 9
Having thus disposed of counsel's suggestion the court did not further
dwell upon the matter of retroactivity.
There are, however, further possibilities the court might have con-
sidered. It could have held that the doctrine applied only to acts and
therefore could not be used here, but this would seem to be merely avoid-
ing the problem. Another possibility would be to apply the doctrine with
the effect that the U. S. S. R. is considered a recognized government from
its very inception in 1918. It would therefore follow logically that the
ative ab initio and so take account of the unrecognized de facto government or
state which existed prior to the political department's action. By means of this
fiction, the judiciary .has frequently found it possible to do justice in matters
of private right without becoming involved in political questions." Dickinson,
The Unrecognized Governwent or State in English and American Law (1923)
22 MIcH. L. REv. 29, 44.
Cases supporting the doctrine of retroactivity are: United States v. Belmont,
301 U. S. 324, 330 (1937); Ricaud v. American Metal Co., Lim., 246 U. S. 304,
309 (1918); Underhill v. Hernandez, 65 Fed. 577 (C. C. A. 2d, I895), af'd, I68
U. S. 250, 253 (1897); Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U. S. 176, 186; Aksionairnoye
Obschestvo Dlia Mechanicheskoyi Obrabotky Diereva A. M. Luther v. Sagor & Co.
generally cited as Luther v. Sagor, (1921) 3 K. B. 532. See also I HACKWORTHi
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1940) 381; HERvEV, LE.AL EFFEcTs OF REcOGNI-
TION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1928) 82.
47. State of Yucatan v. Argumedo, 92 Misc. 547, 553-554, 157 N. Y. Supp. 219,
224-225 (1915); HERva-, op. cit. sapra note 46; quotation from Dickinson, loc. cit.
spra note 46.
48. Dickinson, loc. cit. supra note 46.
49. 304 U. S. 126, 140 (1938). See Vladikavkazky Ry. v. New York Trust Co.,
263 N. Y. 369, 379, 189 N. E. 456, 46o (934); Lehigh Valley RR. v. State of
Russia, 21 F. (2d) 396, 401 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927).
NOTES
U. S. S. R. is also considered as having been able to sue within the proper
time, and since it did not, the statute of limitations is a bar.
However, the courts might have said the doctrine of retroactivity
validates all prior jurisdictional acts of the recognized government and
starts the running of the statute from the moment of recognition, thus
reaching an opposite conclusion.
II. POLICY
The theories discussed above are little more than legal by-paths over
which the courts travel in order to reach a result which will best make
effective the determinations of the government's political departments.
The broad base of international law is undeniably a matter of policy.
The policy of non-recognition of the U. S. S. R., pursued by the
United States from 1918 to 1933,50 has been criticized."' It was most
certainly a departure from the usual United States policy,52 based on long
historical precedent, of according prompt recognition as soon as a new
government had achieved sufficient stability. 53 It created a huge mass
of insurmountable legal and diplomatic difficulties.5" Prompt recognition
would have paved the way for negotiations and differences could have
been adjusted far more quickly and easily.55  It has quite properly been
said that:
"The interests of the old States must suffer quite as much as
those of the new State, if recognition is for any length of time re-
fused." 16
Now that the Soviet government is recognized by the United States
we should make that recognition as advantageous as possible. To bar the
U. S. S. R. from suit because it was previously unable to sue is to give
effect to the repudiated policy of non-recognition. The District Court in
5o. The policy was maintained because the United States contended that the
Soviet government was:
" . . deficient in its observance of the fundamental conditions of interna-
tional intercourse in three respects, namely:
(I) Its failure to accord to the persons and property within its jurisdic-
tion that degree of respect and protection required by international law;
(2) Its failure to respect the international obligations of preceding govern-
ments; and
(3) Its failure to respect the right of other nations to develop their institu-
tions and to conduct their internal affairs without interference or con-
trol by other states."
Hackworth, The Policy of the United States in Recognizing New Governments
During the Past Twenty-Five Years (1931) Am. Soc. INT. L. PROC. 120, 131.
5I. See Dickinson, The Recognition of Russia (1931) 30 Micar. L. REv. 18I.
Contra: (1933) 27 Am. J. INT. L. 290.
52. "We surely cannot deny to any nation that right whereon our own Govern-
ment is founded-that every one may govern itself according to whatever form it
pleases, and change these forms at its own will . . . ." Letter from Thomas Jeffer-
son to Governeur Morris quoted in I MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAw DIGEST (i9o6)
120.
53. 1 MOORE, INTERxAIoNAL LAW DiGsS (i9o6) 119; Dickinson, loc. cit. supra
note 51; Hackworth, The Policy of the United States in Recognizing New Govern-
ments During the Past Twenty-Five Years (1931) Am. Soc. INT. L. PROc. 120.
54. "Whenever an act done by a sovereign in his sovereign character is ques-
tioned it becomes a matter of negotiation, or of reprisals, or of war." Judge An-
drews in Wulfsohn v. R. S. F. S. R., 234 N. Y. 372, 376, 138 N. E. 24, 26 (1923).
See also United States v. Diekelman, 92 U. S. 520, 524 (1875).
55. See Dickinson, loc. cit. supra note 51; Graham, Russian-American Rela-
tions, 1917-1933: An Interpretation (1934) 28 Am. PoL ScI. REv. 387.
56. I OPPENHEim , INTERNATIONAL LAw (5th ed. 1937) § 72, p. 124.
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the National City Bank case said the statute of limitations must be held
to have run for otherwise ". . one of the most effective sanctions of
non-recognition would lose most of its value." 7 This seems to completely
ignore the fact that recognition thus loses much of its value, and recognition
is the policy the courts should now make effective.
It may be argued that it is inconsistent to say an unrecognized govern-
ment cannot sue and yet toll the statute of limitations during that period
of disability. However, we must take into consideration an important
factual situation. While the foreign sovereign is unrecognized the courts
cannot allow it to sue because they are bound by the policy of our political
departments. Now, however, -the attitude of the political departments has
changed-the foreign sovereign is recognized. Is it not then wise for the
attitude of our courts to change and no longer give effect to an outmoded
policy? This would seem to be the most reasonable and wisest treatment
that could'be accorded the Soviet r6gime.
III. CONCLUSION
As a matter of policy it therefore seems clear that the best result will
be achieved by not barring the Soviet actions. Several legal theories may
be applied to make this policy effective. Non-recognition may be con-
sidered a disability tolling the statute of limitations. It will, of course,
have to be admitted that the Provisional Government did not really repre-
sent the Russian State but that the Soviet government was in control.
The doctrine of retroactivity could be applied so that the statute only
started running from the moment of recognition. Perhaps the statute
should not be available as a defense on the ground that the defendant, as a
citizen of the United States and hence part of its government, was instru-
mental in causing it to run. Regardless of which theory is used to reach
the conclusion that the'U. S. S. R. is not barred by the statute of limita-
tions, it is clear that such conclusion is the desirable one for it is supported
by all important considerations of policy.
M. L. H.
57. 41 F. Supp. 353, 355 (S. D. N. Y. i941).
